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Codification and Rule 10b-5
Lewis D. Lowenfels*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most interesting as well as controversial areas of the
securities laws has been the growth of implied liabilities under section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 and Rule lOb-5
2
promulgated thereunder. 3 Any attempt to codify the securities laws
would probably include an attempt to codify this entire lOb-5 area.'
* Member of the New York Bar. A.B. 1957, LL.B. 1961, Harvard University.
1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964) [hereinafter cited as 1934
Act] provides in part:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,'any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors."
2. Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1969) provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
3. Today, it is settled in virtually every circuit that an implied private remedy may be
granted for damages resulting from the violation of § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964), and Rule
lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969). Boone v. Baugh, 308 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1962); Estate
Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527 (10th Cir.
1962); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962); Hooper v.
Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961);
Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369 (3d
Cir. 1956); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
In addition, dicta in other circuits and acceptance of this theory by federal district courts
indicates approval of the doctrine of implied civil liability pursuant to Rule lOb-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1969). See, e.g., Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wis. 1962),
aff d. 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); Nash v. J. Arthur Warner & Co., 137 F. Supp. 615 (D. Mass.
1955).
4. See generally Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW.
793 (1967), and more specifically the quotations in the text accompanying notes 7-12 infra.
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Once the codifiers move into this area, however, there is a strong
likelihood that codification will result in reform and revision, and the
present scope as well as the future growth and development of "federal
corporation law" under Rule lOb-5 will be profoundly altered.' Thus
it would seem that before an attempt is made to codify the body of
law that has evolved from Rule lOb-5, the following questions should
be considered: Is the way the law in this area has developed injurious
to the public interest? Has the legal development under Rule lOb-5
adversely or beneficially affected the securities markets and the public
interest? In short, is there any need for codification, reform, or revision
in the lOb-5 area?6
II. THE REAL AIM OF THE CODIFIERS
At the Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws
held in Chicago in November, 1966, speaker after speaker disclosed a
certain displeasure with existing law in the lOb-5 area and hinted at or
even openly recommended some sort of change. George M. Duff, Jr.
stated quite candidly:
In conclusion, although there are many inconsistencies in the various sections
of the Securities Acts relating to civil liabilities, Rule lOb-5 as interpreted by the
courts emphasizes these inconsistencies and is in most need of careful
reexamination by the Commission or legislative review. I hope that we will be not
like Nero playing the lyre while Rome burns. If we wait too long, we won't have
to codify Section 5 of the 1933 Act. Who needs Section 5 if you have Rule lob-5
around, or Section 14 or Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act? Rule lOb-5
is a much better remedy. At least parts of Sections 9 and 15 of the 1934 Act will
be of no value and there will no longer be any need for Section 17(a) of the '33
Act.
And then after Rule lOb-5 preempts the securities field we will be left with
codifying Rule lOb-5, which is perhaps where we should begin at the present time7
David S. Henkel delivered an illuminating paper on the different
substantive provisions and procedural avenues available to plaintiffs
contemplating suit under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.8 The main thrust of Mr. Henkel's article was
that the specific safeguards enacted by Congress to protect defendants
5. Id.
6. See Loss, History of S.E.C. Legislative Programs and Suggestions for a Code,
Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 804-05 (1967)
(panel discussion by Louis Loss, Richard H. Paul, and A. Fleischer, Jr.).
7. Henkel, Codification- Civil Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws, Conference on
Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 866, 886-87 (1967) (remarks of George
M. Duff, Jr.).
8. Id. at 866-78.
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against civil liabilities have been emasculated by the judicial
implication of private rights under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
[S]pecific safeguards relating to burden of proof, defenses, statutes of limitations
and other conditions to recovery which were thought appropriate by the Congress
when it enacted the specific civil liability provisions are entirely avoided. The result
is that the issuer, the underwriter, the broker-dealer and others have been denied
the protection of the safeguards which many people thought existed and have been
placed with increasing frequency in the position of having to defend actions which,
only a short time ago, were not even contemplated by persons expert in the
securities law field.
It is difficult for me to believe that the draftsmen of the federal securities laws
would have taken the trouble to prescribe the limitations and defenses applicable
to actions brought under the various sections which specifically provide for civil
liabilities if, at the same time, they had contemplated that similar actions without
such limitations and defenses could be brought under various other sections which
do not specifically provide for civil liabilities. In any event, I feel that it would be
in the public interest to strive for some semblance of order and consistency in
this area. In my view 10(b)5 should be a primary target
Professor Louis Loss, the Conference's keynote speaker and the writer
of the leading treatise in the securities law field, expressed his views on
Rule 1Ob-5 in the following fashion:
Still further when one talks about fraud, what sense does it make, really, to
have 17 and 15(c) and 10(b)? Why not a single, central, well-thought-through
fraud provision? Why three except that they grew up in a hodgepodge way?'0
James C. Sargent seemed to echo Professor Loss's view:
It is odd to me that the Rule lOb-5 situation has caused not only an eclipsing of
Section I I and Section 12(2), but practically the elimination of the short statute
of limitations contained in Section 13 of the '33 Act. That is a kind of curious
result.
Rule 10b-5 gives the plaintiff a longer statute of limitations within which to
live which limitations, as you know, tend to be the nearest comparable statute of
limitations of the state where the cause of action was commenced. Where an
investor finds himself in a position where he needs the protection of the '33 Act,
but he is too late to enforce his rights, he moves over to the '34 Act and he is
protected by the longer statute of limitations. At least, so the courts seem to
think."
And Harold W. Marsh, Jr. stated quite openly:
[W]e admit having a love feast here-but I need only mention what we will do
with I0b-5 to tell you that whatever this code says there are going to be people
vehemently opposed to it .... 12
9. Id. at 871.
10. Loss, supra note 6, at 796.
1. Id. at 801 (remarks of James C. Sargent).
12. Cohen, Toward Coordination of 1933 and 1934 Act Disclosure Requirements,
Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 810, 848 (1967)
(remarks of Harold W. Marsh, Jr.).
1970]
VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW
A careful analysis of the above statements cannot help but lead
one to speculate whether codification or even reform is the real aim of
the codifiers. Perhaps it would be more accurate to conclude that their
real motive is substantially to circumscribe the existing scope of Rule
lOb-5 and severely limit any possibilities for its future growth and
expansion.
III. THE PRESENT ROLE OF RULE 1OB-5
If it is decided that the real aim of the codifiers is to inhibit the
growth of implied liabilities under Rule lOb-5, it becomes vital to
assess the present status of this Rule. Has the growth and development
of implied liabilities under this Rule affected the public interest and the
securities markets positively or negatively? Would the reversal of
development in the lOb-5 area envisioned by the codifiers offer more
or less protection to an American public which has a multi-billion
dollar investment in the American securities markets?
There are a number of important areas where the only practical
protection against fraudulent practices in securities trading is provided
by section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. For example, persons who purchase
securities at the same time that a registered public offering is made,
but make such purchase not from the public offering but from the
market that was influenced by a misleading registration statement,
have section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 as their only practical remedy.'
Also, persons who purchase securities pursuant to a transaction exempt
from the registration provisions of the 1933 Act, such as an exchange
by an issuer with its own stockholders, a private placement, or an
intrastate offering, must rely on section 10(b) and Rule l0b-5 as their
only practical protection against fraud." In addition, persons who buy
government securities, including municipal bonds, pursuant to the
exemption supplied by section 3(a)(2) of the 1933 Act must look to
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 for their sole cause of action against
fraudulent practitioners. 5
13. Section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1969), has not been
sufficiently utilized to make it a reliable basis for a private action. Section 12(z), 15
U.S.C. § 771(2) (1964), limits plaintiff to a suit against the person who sold him the securities;
in an open-market purchase the identity of the seller cannot always be determined.
14. In addition to the problems outlined in note 13 supra, a desirable defendant in these
types of situations is often a different person than the one who sold the securities to the defrauded
purchaser. In these circumstances § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1964), cannot be utilized.
15. See Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky.
1960). In all of these situations plaintiffs may sue under state law, but state law has not proven
[VOL. 23
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The proxy area offers an excellent illustration of the importance
of Rule lb-5 in the overall scheme of complete investor protection. In
a merger situation, the SEC has promulgated itemized rules of
disclosure, 6 including a broad fraud rule,17 and the Supreme Court in
the Borak case added a powerful implied private right of action. 8 The
SEC's proxy, rules, however, are inapplicable to all companies not
registered under section 12 of the 1934 Act, 9 and even for section 12
companies, if the fraud is not in the proxy statement, but solely in some
other phase of the transaction, the Borak right is nonexistent .2 In these
situations the only practical remedy a defrauded investor has is under
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
Because of the limitations of section 15 of the 1934 Act, Rule
15cl-2, promulgated by the SEC to deal with fraud by brokers,2' can
only prohibit brokers' frauds in the over-the-counter securities
markets.2 2 It is left for Rule lOb-5 to offer a private remedy to persons
defrauded by brokers through stock exchange transactions. Similarly,
Rule lOb-5 can be a valuable tool in discouraging market
manipulations. Section 9 of the 1934 Act, the specific antimanipulative
provision of the securities acts, is so burdened with difficult, if not
impossible, requirements of proving causation, it is practically useless
as a basis for private remedies in the manipulation area? 3 Finally, Rule
lOb-5 is becoming important in the area of misleading corporate
publicity. Section 18 of the 1934 Act covers only misleading reports
filed with the SEC or the stock exchanges; its application is further
restricted by proof requirements and available defenses which make
investor suits almost meaningless exercises.24 Rule lOb-5, on the other
hand, permits suits against persons publicly disseminating any
fraudulent corporate reports and eliminates the impossible hurdles
imposed by section 18.25
In addition to its role as a backstop, or what Professor William
to be an effective tool in combatting securities fraud in what is primarily a national, interstate
economy.
16. 17C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 (Schedule 14A) (1964).
17. Rule 14a-9(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (1969).
18. J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
19. 1934 Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1964).
20. See J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Rule 14a-9(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-
9(a) (1969).
21. Rule 15(c)1-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-2 (1969).
22. 1934 Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1964).
23. Id. § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1964).
24. Id. § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1964).
25. See Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968).
1970]
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L. Cary has termed a "roving center in the anti-fraud field,""0 the
broad language of Rule 10b-5 has provided investor protection in what
are today evolving or frontier areas of the securities laws. The vital
concept of eliminating trading on inside information which matured
with the SEC's decision in Cady, Roberts & Co. 2 1 and reached full
flower in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case,2 is bottomed on section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5. The problem of misleading corporate publicity and
fraudulent press releases can probably be dealt with effectively only
under the broad provisions of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Indeed, for
a time the SEC considered adopting rules in the publicity area, but
abandoned this idea partly because of the difficulty of formulating
standards and partly because of the availability of the general anti-
fraud provisions.29 The whole area of intra-corporate fiduciary
duties-the duties of management to stockholders, of majority
stockholders to minority stockholders, and of "inside" directors to
"outside" directors-is coming under the increasing scrutiny of the
federal courts asserting jurisdiction on the basis of section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-571 The stockholders' derivative suit based upon section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5-with its nationwide service of process and venue, its
avoidance of state security for costs and short statute of limitation
requirements, and its use of the modern discovery techniques provided
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-has proved a vital aid to SEC
enforcement in an era of reduced government budgets and high SEC
staff turnover 1 In sum, Rule lOb-5 has encouraged the courts to free
themselves from the technical restrictions of common law fraud
developed by a society concerned largely with chattels and tangible
products. Rule lOb-5 has made complete nondisclosure equivalent to
an affirmative misrepresentation, 3 has eliminated scienter,33 and has
substantially diluted privity.34 It is, therefore, difficult to conclude that
26. Cary, Summation: Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus.
LAW. 793, 909 (1967).
27. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
28. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
29. See A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAWS: FRAUD-SEC RULE 10B-5, § 7.2(3), at 152 n.43
(1969).
30. See McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939
(1961); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wis. 1962), affd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir.
1963).
31. See Lowenfels, Rule lOb-5 and the Stockholder's Derivative Action, 18 VAND. L, REV.
893 (1965).
32. See A. BROMBERG, supra note 29, § 8.2, at 197 n.6.
33. Id. § 8.4, at 203 n.24.
34. Id. § 8.5, at 205 n.28.
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these developments have not resulted in much greater protection for the
investing public.
IV. CONCLUSION
The results of what the federal courts have done with Rule 10b-5
are truly astounding. An obscure rule promulgated by an
administrative agency to combat fraud has become the basis of much
of our contemporary securities law 5 Certain academicians might be
offended by the lack of order or symmetry in such a development;
certain corporate interests might sense a threat to their established
powers or properties; but by and large the growth and development
under Rule 10b-5 have served the public interest. The American
securities markets are among the most honest in the world, and Rule
lOb-5 has played no small role in establishing this integrity. What
interests would be served by codification in the 10b-5 area? Congress
codified an insider trading provision under section 16(b) of the 1934
Act, and its implementation has not been highly successful3  Congress
attempted to insert provisions prohibiting "tipping" into section 16(b),
but dropped the idea "presumably because of the difficulty in
administering it. 37 The SEC attempted to draft certain rules governing
corporate publicity, but abandoned this venture because it was too
difficult 8 These are but a sampling of the areas to which Rule 10b-5
has been applied.
Congress enacted section 10(b) in broad and sweeping terms,
delegating to the SEC the job of promulgating specific rules to outlaw
securities fraud. 9 In accordance with this legislative mandate, the
Commission has adopted a number of rules during the last 36 years,
but in reality it has been left for the federal courts, using Rule lOb-5
as the springboard, to implement the purposes underlying section 10(b)
in an effective manner. Fraud has many faces, many forms, and many
nuances. Placed in the context of highly sophisticated securities
markets, fraud can be regulated only by the judiciary, pragmatically,
on a case by case basis. As one leading authority has stated: "[R]igid
35. For an amusing description of the origin of Rule lOb-5, see 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 921-23
(1967) (remarks of Milton Freeman).
36. Until recently the federal courts felt compelled to apply § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
(1964), in a rigid, mechanistic fashion which often engendered curious, if not unjust, results. See
Lowenfels, Section 16(b): A New Trend in Regulating Insider Trading, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 45
(1968).
37. A. BROMBERG, supra note 29, § 7.5(2), at 190.7 n.218.
38. See A. BROMBERG, supra note 29.
39. 1934 Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
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rules are not adaptable to the wide variety of securities transactions
that may occur in an economy as highly developed as ours."4
Codification may be appropriate in certain areas of the securities laws,
but to codify fraud will be to inhibit, not to expand, protection for the
investing public.
40. A. BROMBERG, supra note 29, § 8.9, at 223.
